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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARBON CANAL COMPANY, a cor-
poration, et al, 
Appellants, 
-vs.-
SANPETE \\7 ATER USERS ASSO- ' 
CIATION, a corporation, and WAYNE 
D. CRIDDLE, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah, 
Respondents, 
1TNITED STATES STEEL ·CORPOR-
ATION, a corporation, 
Intervenor. 
Case No. 
9133 
BRIEF of RESPONDENT'S 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On December 1, 1958, Plaintiffs filed an action in 
the District Court of Sanpete County seeking to have 
that Court reverse a decision theretofore made by the 
State Engineer, under date of October 7, 1958, granting 
an extension of time to the Sanpete Water Users Asso-
ciation to and including January 31, 1961 in which to 
submit proof of the construction of the works and the 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
application of water to beneficial use under Applica-
tion No. 9593 on file in the office of the State Engineer. 
(R. 1-9). The Court affirmed the decision of the State 
Engineer with respect to granting the extension of time 
but provided that the Sanpete Water Users Association 
(hereinafter referred to as Applicant) would be given 
a period of two years "from the date that this order 
shall become final by lapse of time in which to file 
an appeal therefrom, or in the event an appeal is 
taken to the Supreme Court, from the date of the is-
suance by said court of the remittitur on final judginent 
affirming this judgment.'' (R. 30) The Court also at-
tached certain conditions to its order, which conditions 
are being complied with. (R. 31). Plaintiffs (hereinafter 
referred to as Appellants have appealed from the 
decision of the lower court upon the ground that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment. The 
statement of facts contained in Appellants' brief does 
not give a fair state1nent of the facts, but appears to 
be argumentative and states the evidence most favorable 
to Appellants. For that reason, Applicant \viii restate 
the evidence as it appears in the record. 
STATEl\!ENT OF FACTS 
Application nu1nber 9593 (being the application in-
volved in this case) was originally filed on September 
11, 192± by John L. Bench of Fairview, Utah, "for 
and in behalf of the "Tater users of Sanpete County." 
The application sought to appropriate 15,000 acre feet 
of water from Gooseberry ·Creek located in Sanpete 
Oounty by constructing a dam across the creek at ''That 
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is kno,vn as the "Narrows" site, (Exhibit 3). Since the 
filing of this application, the project has been known 
generally as the Gooseberry Project. 
The day after the filing of Application 9593, a 
~Ir. E. B. Jorgensen made an application designated 
as 9594 (which application was later assigned to the Price 
River Water Conservancy District) seeking to appro-
priate 90,000 acre feet of water from Fish Creek, of 
'vhich Gooseberry Creek is a tributary. This application 
seeks appopriation at a point lower on the stream than 
the application 9593, (Exhibit 1). Application 9594 is 
now owned by the United States of America pursuant to 
an assignment made by the Price River Water Conserv-
ancy District under date of May 6, 1946 (Exhibit 23). It is 
interesting to note that although Appellants in this 
case claim Applicant did not show diligence in proceed-
ing to construct the Gooseberry dam and putting the 
water to beneficial use up until the time of the assign-
ment to the Federal Government in 1946 the Price 
River Water Conservancy District (one of Appellants 
herein) had not even advertised as required by Section 
73-3-6 U.C.A. 1953 which is one of the first steps toward 
obtaining approval of the application. (R. 133) 
The State Engineer originally rejected Application 
9593 from which decision an appeal was taken to the 
District Court of Sanpete County. While the matter 
was pending in the court and prior to the time that 
either party brought the matter on for hearing, the 
Sanpete ·County interests endeavored to obtained fi-
nancing for the construction of the Gooseberry project. 
Plans w·ere drawn up for the construction of the tunnel 
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phase of the project and were actually submitted to 
Washington for approval so that public funds, either 
under the Works Progress Administration or the Case-
Wheeler Act might be made available to assist in the 
development of the project, (R. 88, Exhibit 7). However, 
it was then learned that the appeal from the State En-
gineer to the district court had never been resolved so 
that the matter was immediately brought to trial and 
hearing, (R. 88, 89). 
After hearing the appeal from the State Engineer's 
decision, the district court, on February 11, 1939, made 
and entered its Findings of Fact in which it found 
among other things : 
"13. ·That the lands owned by the plaintiff, 
and by the parties in whose interest said applica-
tion was made, hereinabove referred to, are arid, 
and, without the application for irrigation, are 
sterile and unproductive, but ,~vith water for the 
irrigation thereof they can, and will be, made 
productive, and upon which crops of all kinds 
that are raised on similar lands in the State of 
Utah can be produced; that the water supply 
available for the irrigation of the said lands 
hereinabove referred to and heretofore appro-
priated for the purpose of irrigating the same 
is insufficient and the waters sought to be ap-
propriated by the application 9593 are necessary 
in order to supply a full a1nount of \Vater to 
properly irrigate the said lands; that the entire 
amount sought to be appropriated, together with 
the water right now available for the irrigation 
of said lands, \vill not be 1nore than sufficient 
to irrigate the sa1ne. 
"1-l-. The Court further finds that at the 
time of the filing of said application numbered 
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9593, there was unappropriated water in the said 
Gooseberry Creek at the point where it is sought 
to store said water and to divert the same from 
said Gooseberry Creek, and that from time to 
time and from year to year, and has ever since 
that time been water over and above all prior 
appropriation5 -and subject to be appropriated 
under said application, and that no rights of 
the defendants, or either of them, will be preju-
diced by the granting and approval of the said 
application of the plaintiff, John L. Bench, num-
ber 9593, and that the said plaintiff is entitled 
to have his application approved and to have such 
approval made of record in the State Engineer's 
office of the State of Utah. 
"15. The Court further finds that the action 
of the State Engineer of the State of Utah in 
rejecting and denying the application of the plain-
tiff herein, numbered 9593, was arbitrary and in 
violation of the rights of the said plaintiff, John 
L. Bench, and that the allowance of said appli-
cation and the prosecution of the appropriation 
therein proposed will not injure or impair the 
vailue of the existing rights of the defendants, 
or either of them, nor will the same interfere 
with any more beneficial use of the waters of 
sad Gooseberry Creek sought to be appropriated 
by said application, nor any other rights what-
soever, nor will such appropriation and use as 
proposed in said application number 9593 be det-
rimental to the public welfare nor interfere with 
any prior applications or existing rights of the 
defendants herein, or either of them." (Exhibit 2) 
Respondents have felt it necessary to set forth 
verbatim the findings of the Court in regard to the 
matter of the approval of the application because of 
the attempt on the part of Appellants to raise an 
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issue as to availability of water. However, the decision 
of the lower court was not appealed and therefore 
the matter in respect to the above findings is now res 
judicata as to any claim or issue as to the insufficiency 
of the water supply to be appropriated under the ap-
plication number 9593. 
Too, under the provisions of Section 73-3-12, U.C.A. 
1953, time in which to prove up on the application com-
mences to run from the date of the approval of such 
application and the State Engineer is authorized to 
grant extensions not exceeding 14 years "after the date 
of approval." Likewise, because Appellants have made 
considerable point of the fact that nothing was appar-
ently done to commence construction during the period 
1924 through 1939, we should point out to the Court 
that Section 73-3-10 U:C.A. 1953, provides: 
"If the application is rejected, the applicant 
shall take no steps toward the prosecution of the 
proposed work or the diversion or use of the 
public "\Vater so long as such rejection shall con-
tinue in force." 
Immediately after the decision "\vas rendered by the 
District Court requiring the State Engineer to approve 
the application, the Sanpete interests proceeded to ob-
tain the approval of plans for the construction of the 
project and by 1941-42 'vere in the process of surveying 
and making appraisal of the rights of way to be ac-
quired for canals and the tunnel "Then \Vorld War II 
commenced, (R. 65). Obviously, the advent of war put 
a stop to any further developn1ent of any irrigation 
projects including a sister project called the Scofield 
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Project on the Price River, (R. 67). For many years 
prior to World War II, the Bureau of Reclamation 
had been very interested in the development of the 
Price River and had from time to time made surveys 
of various irrigation and storage projects along the 
Price River and its tributaries, including Gooseberry 
Creek where the proposed Gooseberry reservoir was 
to be constructed. In the course of its surveys, the 
Bureau of Reclamation had tied together two projects 
kno,vn as Scofield and Gooseberry. The Scofield Reser-
voir is located several miles below the Gooseberry Pro-
ject and there had actually been a dam constructed on 
the Price River at this point, (R. 102). Exhibit 10 out-
lines the various studies and reports made by the Bureau 
of Reclamation on the Price River from August 15, 
1917 to 1941, in respect to the proposed Gooseberry 
Project. Several reports have been filed since that time. 
(See Exhibits 12, 14 and 15). 
Even though World War II put a stop to civilian 
construction of projects such as the Gooseberry Project, 
the ,Carbon County interests took advantage of what 
appeared to be an emergency and urged the Federal 
Government to step in and rebuild the Scofield Dan1 
on the Price River because of the threat of damage to 
the transportation facilities of the D. & R.G.W. Rail-
road should the Scofield Dam either go out or should 
it be sabotaged. A meeting was held at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, in 1942 at which representatives of the State, the 
Bureau of Reclamation, the railroads, Carbon County 
groups and the Sanpete County interests were present 
by invitation and participated in the discussion, (R. 68, 
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72) Mr. Jerman, representing the Bureau of Reclama-
tion recounted the history of the Gooseberry and Sco-
field projects at this meeting and stated that they 
both should be constructed as one project and that the 
Bureau had been hopeful that they could have been 
constructed from public funds, but in view of the emerg-
ency that now confronted the people, he hoped that 
the Sanpete interests would defer going ahead with 
the Gooseberry project and allow the Carbon ·County 
people to construct the Scofield project with government 
funds if that were possible, (R. 83). Others, including 
J. Bracken Lee, then Mayor of Price, discussed the 
need for rebuilding the Scofield Reservoir, (R. 83). 
Finally, Mr. Elmo Irons, representing the Sanpete 
group, stated that if the keeping of the two projects 
in one program would hinder the rebuilding of the 
Scofield dam, the Sanpete interests would step aside 
and permit the Scofield dam to be constructed as 
the first unit of a single project and "then when the 
time came that Gooseberry could go ahead, then the 
other unit of the single project would be constructed," 
(R. 84). 
Following this meeting, approval was given for the 
rebuilding of the Scofield dam, which \Vas done during 
the years 1943 to 1946. The cost of the dam was ap-
proximately one 1nillion dollars, of \vhich the Carbon 
County water users (prin1arily the Appellants herein) 
paid one hundred thousand dollars, and the balance 
was paid by the Federal Governn1ent, (R. 116, 128). 
In connection with the rebuilding of the Scofield Reser-
voir, a contract was entered into between the United 
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States and the Carbon Water Conservancy District and 
Priee River Water Conservancy District relating to 
the construction of the Scofield dam and the subse-
quent development of the Gooseberry Project. (Exhibit 
13). This agreement, commonly referred to as the Tri-
partite agreement, sets out that "the United States 
proposes, as the principal feature of the diversion plan 
(herein called the Gooseberry Plan) to build storage 
and diversion \vorks on the Price River system at a 
point or points above the confluence of the Cabin Hollow 
Creek and Gooseberry Creek.'' The agreement further 
identifies the Gooseberry project as a part of the entire 
progra1n for developn1ent of the Price River and the 
irrigation district, under paragraph 13 (b) stipulates 
that its Application numbered 9594 will be assigned 
to the United States and also that its right under ap-
plication 1035 ('Certificates No. 2046, 8989A, 13334) 
are to be subordinated to the rights of the United 
States in connection with the development of the Goose-
berry project. (Exhibit 13, p. 5). 
Following the close of World War II, the Sanpete 
County interests began to formulate plans and to take 
steps to initiate the construction of the tunnel as the 
first phase of the Project. An application was made in 
1948 to the Utah Water and Power Board for a loan 
of Ninety Thousand Dollars which loan, together with 
private funds available, would be sufficient to construct 
the tunnel. (R. 141-143) However, at that time the 
Bureau of Reclamation stepped in and requested that 
the Sanpete people defer the construction of the Goose-
berry project at what has been commonly described 
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as the "Narrows" site and to permit the Bureau of 
Reclamation to proceed on a larger project being worked 
on by the Bureau at what is knovvn as the "Mammoth" 
site, a location somewhat downstream and one which 
would produce substantially more water for irrigation 
in Sanpete County. The Bureau's action of course was 
taken under its rights given by the Tri-partite agree-
ment executed with the Carbon County Water Con-
servancy District and Price River Water Conservancy 
District in 1943. Consequently, after a meeting with the 
Utah Water and Power Board, the Sanpete interests 
gave up the loan which had been approved and au-
thorized the Bureau to proceed with its plans for the 
construction of the larger project. (R. 141-144). 
In August of 1950, Applicant filed a request for 
an extension of time stating: 
"Original Surveys were made, test pits dug, 
ground cleared of underbrush. The Bureau of 
Reclamation proposed to build a dam and tunnel 
to use the water covered by this and other ap-
plications; more than $20,000.00 was spent to 
explore the foundation conditions at the dam site, 
to drill four holes vvith diamond drill to test 
ground through which tunnel is to be drilled. 
Distributions location also surveyed. Land and 
water use study made in the area. Construction 
was stopped by ,.\T orld ,,-.-ar II, and agreement 
was made with the Bureau of Reclamation, and 
other government agencies that \vith the enlarge-
ment of the Scofield Reservoir the dam to im-
pound the water under this application should 
next be built, but funds were withdrawn by 
government order on account of the war; the 
Utah Water and Power Board then allocated 
$90,000.00 to begin the dam and tunnel, P,nd 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
$2,000.00 was spent in further exploration work. 
The Bureau of Reclamation then proposed to 
build the extensive projects on the Colorado 
River system, including the Echo Park and the 
Central Utah projects and tied this project of 
'vhich this water right is the base into the Colo-
rado Projects and the Central Utah. Under this 
condition work was temporarily suspended, and 
the $90,000 turned back. 
"The nature, extent and estimated cost of 
construction remaining to be done to complete 
the work in accordance with the application fol-
lows: 
"It is proposed to complete construction of 
a dam on the Gooseberry Creek with tunnel for 
transmountain diversion, and districtuion canals 
and works, at an estimate cost of approximately 
$2,000,000.00, the project to be tied in with the 
Projects on the Colorado River and the Central 
Utah from financial and administrative stand-
point; if these projects are not developed in the 
next very few years, it is proposed to complete 
the dam and tunnel in cooperation with the Utah 
Water and Power Board." (Italics Added) (Ex. 5) 
The foregoing extension of ti1ne was granted giving 
Applicant to and including March 11, 1953, which was 
the end of the first fourteen years following approval 
of the original application. Thereafter, the Bureau of 
Reclamation completed its final survey and investigation 
of the Gooseberry Project and published its report dated 
January, 1953, recommending the Gooseberry Project 
'~as a participating project in the Colorado River Stor-
age Project." (Ex. 14). In a letter, dated January 15, 
1953, to the Commissioner from the Regional Director 
appears the following statement: 
11 
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"This report is submitted for your approval 
and as a basis for appropriate action to secure 
congressional authorization of the Gooseberry 
project in central Utah as a participating project 
in the plan for the Colorado River Storage pro-
ject. The Gooseberry project was among the first 
developments recommended by States of the Up-
per Colorado River Basin for participation in 
the benefits and revenues of the storage project." 
(Ex. 14, p. 1) 
Inasmuch as the time for proving up on Applica-
tion 9593 would expire on March 11, 1953, a further 
request for extension of time was filed by Applicant 
in which it was again stated: 
"It is proposed to complete construction of 
a dam on the Gooseberry Creek, at an estimated 
cost of approximately $2,000,000.00, the project 
to be tied in as a participating project with the 
projects on the Colorado River and the Central 
Utah Project from a financial and administrative 
standpoint; if these projects are not developed 
within the next few years, 1"t is proposed to com-
plete the dam and tunnel in cooperation w~th the 
Utah Water and Power Board. Bills for the 
construction of the Colorado River Projects and 
the related and participating projects are cur-
rently being introduced into the 1Wtional con-
gress." (Ex. 6) (Italics added) 
In connection \vith the filing of the foregoing request 
in March of 1953, Applicant considered the over all prob-
lem before it and \vhat \Vould be done in the event that for 
any reason the proposal of the Bureau of Reclamation 
to include the Gooseberry project in the Upper Colorado 
River progran1 \vould be rejected by Congress and no 
appropriation made. It was determined that should such 
12 
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an eventuality occur, the Sanpete interests would proceed 
on their own initiative with the assistance of the Utah 
Water and Power Board to construct the Gooseberry 
Reservoir at the site originally selected and which had 
been maintained in effect through the extensions of time. 
(R. 151-152, 182-183) Therefore, in submitting the appli-
cation for an extension of time, the letter of transmittal 
acco1npanying the written Request, written by Ralph 
Blackham, President of Sanpete Water Users Associa-
tion, advised the State Engineer that "Inasmuch as the 
Gooseberry Project has been included in the Upper Colo-
rado River Report to Congress we feel we are entirely 
justified in asking that an extension of time be granted 
on the enclosed application." 
Since the request filed in 1953 was for additional 
time beyond the first fourteen years, it was necessary 
under Section 73-3-12, U.C.A. 1953, for the State Engineer 
to publish notice of the request for such extension In 
order to allow interested parties to file a protest. 
It is significant that no one protested this request 
for additional time even though notice of the same was 
given to Appellants and even though the request was 
couched in language clearly indicating that additional 
time in Yvhich to complete the project would be necessary 
if the Gooseberry Project as a part of the Upper ·Colorado 
River development was not "developed within the next 
fe"\v years." Nor did the State Engineer in granting the 
extension of time give any indication that Applicant was 
not entirely justified (as pointed out by Mr. Blackham) 
in tieing the project into the Colorado River development. 
Neither did he suggest that if the over-all Colorado River 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
development was delayed it would not be possible to ob-
tain further extensions of time to complete the dam and 
tunnel in cooperation with the Utah Water and Power 
Board. 
The matter was submitted to Congress in the form 
of proposed legislation which would have authorized 
the construction of the Gooseberry Project as a part of 
the Upper Colorado River Project but the funds were 
not appropriated for such purpose. It is significant that 
while the proposed legislation was pending in Congress, 
hearings were held and protests were made by Appellants 
in this action to the proposed appropriation. (See Exs. 18 
and 19). Although Applicant had cooperated with Carbon 
County groups to construct the Scofield Dam with pub-
lic funds (the dam costing approximately $1,000,000.00 of 
which Carbon County paid $100,000.00) Appellants in 
this matter failed to support the Gooseberry Project when 
it came up for consideration before the ·Congress of the 
United States. Although some of Appellants at first 
wrote letters approving the proposed appropriation, they 
later actively opposed the san1e and sent representatives 
to Washington to appear before Congressional commit-
tees in opposition thereto. (R. 146, 1-±7) 
Even though the appropriation 'vas not made by 
Congress, Public Law 485 ":hich "\Yas passed in the 84th 
Congress, Second Session (Approved April11, 1956) re-
ferred the matter back to the Secretary of the Interior 
for the purpose of making a further planning report. (Ex. 
24) Between the time of the deletion of the Gooseberry 
Project from the Appropriations Bill and the passage of 
Public Law 485, representatives of the Sanpete ''Tater 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Users Association met with Governor George D. Clyde 
(then Director of the Utah Water and Power Board) to 
deter1nine \vhat further action might be taken in order 
to insure the construction of the Gooseberry Project. (R. 
185). Concern was expressed over whether or not further 
extension of time would be granted to prove up on the ap-
plication unless immediate action were taken to commence 
construction. However, Mr. Clyde advised the representa-
tives of Sanpete that it was his firm belief "that in case 
of a show down, the application to appropriate covering 
this 15,000 acre feet of water would be extended becaust~ 
he believed that due diligence had been exercised in the 
attempts of the Sanpete County Water Users to consum-
ate this project. Matters beyond their control arose to 
interfere and therefore, they shouldn't be penalized for 
these conditions." (Ex. 26) He went on to point out that 
Applicant should permit further investigation by the 
Bureau of Reclamation and as a consequence it was 
concluded: 
"That ~fr. Clyde would verbally discuss this 
matter with 1\tfr. E. 0. Larson and urge him to 
begin immediately the further investigations of 
the Gooseberry Project which would include not 
only a ne"T study of water supply on the Price 
River and all of its tributaries but the present 
uses of water and the lands on which water is now 
being utilized and the water requirements in the 
Price River area. Mr. ·Clyde would prepare a writ-
ten recommendation to the Board that they con-
tinue their support of the Gooseberry Project and 
request the Bureau of Reclamation, officially if 
necessary, to immediately proceed with the investi-
gations necessary to a revision of the Gooseberry 
Project proposal." (Ex. 26) 
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The investigation was completed by the Bureau of 
Reclamation and its report submitted to Jay Bingham, 
Director of the Utah Water and Power Board, under date 
of September 19, 1957. (Ex. 15) While the report con-
cludes that the Gooseberry Project at the "Narrows" 
site was economically feasible (having a benefit cost ratio 
of 1.5 to 1) the Bureau pointed out that it would not be 
possible to go ahead with further studies "until we are 
assured of a settlement between the conflicting issues of 
the Price River and Sanpete areas." 
Immediately after receiving the information contain-
ed in the supplemental report of the Bureau of Reclama-
tion, Applicant filed with the Utah Water and Power 
Board an application for a loan with which to commence 
construction of the tunnel. (Ex. 28) It hired a competent 
engineer to proceed to prepare plans and specifications 
for the tunnel work and has pursued its efforts to get 
actual construction on the tunnel started but again has 
met with strong opposition from Appellants which has 
delayed actual construction. (R. 154-175) At the request 
of the engineer in charge, preliminary excavation work 
was done in March of 1958 and as further evidence of its 
good faith additional expense has been incurred for en-
gineering since then. (R. 189-192) According to the testi-
mony of Richard C. Hansen, the engineer employed by 
Applicant, final plans and specifications for the tunnel 
could be completed within a relatively short period of 
time so that contracts for construction could be let before 
the expiration of the extension of tin1e granted by the 
State Engineer. (R. 175) 
During the ti1ne that the Bureau of Reclamation has 
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been surveying and preparing for the construction of the 
Gooseberry Project, it has expended a total of $100,099.28 
(Ex. 11) through 1\tlarch 31, 1959. Since the Bureau did 
not have any filings of its own on the Gooseberry Project 
site, its survey vvork and investigation was done under 
Application 9593. (R. 118) In addition to the expendi-
tures by the Bureau of Reclamation, the Utah Water and 
I)o-vver Board fro1n J nne, 1948 to April, 1959, has expend-
ed $3,894.41 (Ex. 25). Applicant itself has spent several 
thousand dollars as set forth in Exhibits 5 and 6, including 
the an1ount spent since the report of the Bureau was given 
in September, 1957. (Ex. 15) The amount of the expendi-
tures by the Applicant are also set forth in the testimony 
of Keith Hansen and shown by Exhibit 29. 
STATE1fENT OF POINTS 
Appellants have set forth three issues which they 
submit to the Court for consideration. In addition to 
those issues, Respondents maintain that there are tvvo 
issues \vhich are equally as important and which if deter-
mined adversely to Appellants will resolve the matters 
before the Court. As determined by Respondents, the 
follo,ving are the issues in this case which will be argued 
in the order listed: 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PROTEST THE 
DECISION OF THE 8TATE ENGINEER BECAUSE THEY 
CANNOT BE AFFE·CTED BY SUCH DECISION. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PROTEST 'THE 
DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER BECAUSE THEY 
DO NO'T COME INTO COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS. 
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
FINDING OF DUE DILIGENCE. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFI·CIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
FINDING OF REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY. 
POINT V 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS ARE NO·T ENTITLED TO PROTEST THE 
DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER BECAUSE THEY 
CANNOT BE AFFE·CTED BY SUCH DECISION. 
Section 73-3-12, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes any "person 
interested" to file a protest to the granting of a request 
for an extension of time. "Interested" means more than 
having a casual concern as a member of the public, but 
implies that it should be someone who has been or may 
be adversely affected by the granting of the request -
someone who has a subsequent Application for appro-
priation which cannot be prosecuted until completion 
of the \vork on the prior appropriation or "\vho may have 
his application denied because of a prior application 
which is not diligently prosecuted to completion. The 
language of the statute relating to appeals from the de-
cision of the State Engineer supports this view. Section 
73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953, states that any person "aggrieved" 
by the decision may appeal to the district court. 
In the case of Brou,ghton' s Estate v. Central Oregon 
Irrigation Distri,ct, 165 Or. 435, 101 P.2d 425, the Supreme 
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Court of Oregon discussed what was meant by the term 
''interested party" in connection with the right of a person 
to protest an application for extension of time to prove 
up on inchoate water rights. The court held that where 
the "interested party" involved would be in a position 
to make use of and appropriate the water such party 
was interested and could protest the granting of the ex-
tension. Appellants here are not "interested parties" 
within the purview of the above decision, first because 
they have assigned away their rights under Application 
9594 and other rights to the Federal Government and 
second because the basis of their contention is that there 
is insufficient water available to satisfy all existing 
rights. 
The Federal Government holds applications to ap-
propriate the waters of Gooseberry Creek and surround-
ing tributaries of the Price River which are prior applvca-
ti·ons to any of those of Appellants so that in the event of 
the failure of Applicant to prove up on Application 9593 
such applications would be first in right. It therefore 
appears obvious that appellants are not "interested" in 
the matter as contemplated by the statute. (R. 118,119, Ex. 
13) The Bureau of Reclamation has not objected in any 
way to further extensions of time to assist Applicant 
in proving up on its Application. The Bureau has at all 
times cooperated with Applicant and rendered assistance 
in surveying, planning, and even attempting to obtain 
funds with which to construct the dam and works. As 
testified by Mr. Parley R. Neeley, Engineer for the Bu-
reau of Reclamation, the Bureau had no water filings 
of its own on the "Narrows" site so that in connection 
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with its investigations and survey work "the Bureau of 
Reclamation was relying on the application owned by the 
Sanpete County interests." (R. 118) 
Mr. 1\J eeley testified, and the evidence otherwise dis-
closes, that for many years the Gooseberry Project has 
been tied into Upper Colorado River development not only 
by activity but by actual contract between the Carbon 
County Water Users and the Bureau of Reclamation by 
the Tri-partite agreement of 1944. (Ex. 13) By this 
agreement, in which the Sanpete vVaters Users are the 
third party beneficiaries, the Carbon County Water 
Conservancy District and Price River \Vater Conserva-
tion District assigned to the United States certain water 
filings, including Application No. 9594 for the appropria-
tion of ninety thousand acre feet of water (from Goose-
berry Creek) so that there could be no claim subsequently 
made that water users in Carbon County would be ad-
versely affected by the construction of the Gooseberry 
Project. (Exh. 23) Since the execution of that a"greement 
the Bureau of Reclamation has spent thousands of dollars 
in engineering and survey studies. The evidence in this 
case is that since the last extension of tin1e $22,833.83 has 
been spent, making a total expenditure through nfarch 
of 1959 of $100,099.28. (Ex. 11) The direct results and 
benefits of this work have been for the purpose of estab-
lishing the feasibility of the Gooseberry Project and 
preparing for the actual construction thereof. All of this 
work and particularly that part relating to the engineer-
ing and survey of the tunnel and dam site inures to the 
benefit of Applicant here and has been made available 
to the Engineer who is preparing the plans and specifica~ 
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tions for the tunnel. (R. 157-165) 
If, as Appellants contend, there is not sufficient 
water to satisfy all of the prior rights of the Appellants 
and at the saine time allovv sufficient water to be stored 
to satisfy the rights of the Applicant under 9593 there 
surely would not be any reason to suppose that there 
would be sufficient water to satisfy the application of the 
Bureau of Reclamation under 9594 for an additional 
90,000 acre feet before any subsequent clams of Appel-
lants would be affected. Obviously, Applicant does not in-
tend to encroach upon prior, valid and subsisting rights. 
For the foregoing reasons Applicant submits that Appel-
lants are in no position to appeal from the ruling of the 
State Engineer or the decision of the lower court, since 
they cannot be affected by such determination. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PROTEST 'THE 
DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER BECAUSE THEY 
DO NOIT COME INTO COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS. 
In outlining the proceedings for revievv of the deci-
sions of the State Engineer our statute, Section 73-3-15, 
provides that : 
"The pleadings, practice and procedure in 
suits to review decisions of the state engineer shall 
be the same as in other equity cases. The hearing 
in the district court shall proceed as a trial de novo 
and shall be tried to the court as other equitable 
actions." 
A well-known equitable maxim which has application 
to the facts in this case is "he who comes into equity must 
come with clean hands." This maxim signifies that a 
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party will be denied relief in equity on the ground that 
his conduct has been inequitable. Expressed another way 
"he that has committed inequity shall not have equity." 
(See 19 Am. Jur., EQUITY, Sec. 469, p. 324). Thus in 
the Broughton's Estate Case, supra, the Court held "be-
cause of having hindered the Broughton's Estates in the 
development of their inchoate water rights, the irrigation 
district is not now in a position to complain of the delay." 
The evidence in this case clearly demonstrates the 
inequitable conduct of Appellants in attempting to defeat 
the development of the Gooseberry Project after having 
received the cooperation of the Sanpete County interests 
to construct the Scofield Dam upon the express under-
standing that the Gooseberry project would be next com-
pleted. Indeed some of the Appellants now before this 
c·ourt filed with George D. Clyde Letters of approval 
to be submitted to the Congressional Committee investi-
gating the matter. Thereafter the same parties attempted 
to retract said letters of approval and appeared before 
the Congressional committee in opposition to the contem-
plated appropriation. (See Exs. 18 and 19) 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
FINDING OF DUE DILIGENCE. 
At the ouset, we wish to point out to the Court that 
the State Engineer has already ruled that Applicant has 
shown "diligence or reasonable cause of delay" as that 
term is used in Section 73-3-15, U.C.A. 1953. Likewise, 
the trial court after a trial de novo of the 1natter has 
determined that: 
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"7. ·The said determination and order of the 
defendant state engineer granting an extension of 
titne was and is supported by the evidence and 
should be affinned except as hereinafter indicated. 
'~8. Under all the facts and circumstances in 
this case, defendant Sanpete Water Users Associa-
tion has shown reasonable diligence in proceeding 
to prove up on its application and to put the water 
to beneficial use. 
"9. The court further finds that said Sanpete 
Water Users Association has shown reasonable 
cause for delay in constructing the entire works 
and diverting the water to the lands in Sanpete 
County." (R. 27) 
In the light of the foregoing we call the Court's atten-
tion to the principle which it has enunciated from time 
to time to the effect that this Court will not disturb a find-
ing of the lower court "unless it was clearly against the 
weight of the evidence or unless the court has misapplied 
the principles of law or equity." Heiselt v. Heiselt (1960) 
349 P.2d 175. See, also, Clotworthy v. Clyde, 1 Utah 2d 
251, 265 p .2d 423. 
What constitutes diligence or reasonable cause for 
delay must be determined upon the facts in each particu-
lar case. So states Wiel on Water Rights as follows : 
"What constitutes dihgence. must be deter-
mined on the facts of each case. It is a question 
of fact for the jury. In an early case the court 
says that the following statements, among others, 
are an accurate statement of the law: 'In appro-
priating unclaimed water on public lands only 
such acts are necessary, and only such indications 
and evidences of appropriation are required as 
the nature of the case and the face of the country 
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will admit of and are under the circumstances and 
at the time practicable.' 'In determining the ques-
tion of the Plaintiffs' diligence in the construction 
of their ditch, the jury have a right to take into 
consideration the circumstances surrounding them 
at the date of their alleged appropriation, such as 
the nature and climate of the country traversed 
by said ditch, together with all the difficulties of 
procuring labor and materials necessary in such 
cases.'" (1 Wiel, Water Rights in the Western 
States, 3rd Edition, Sec. 383.) (Italics added.) 
A very good statement on \vhat generally constitutes 
diligence is found in 2 Kinney on Irrigation and Water 
Rights, 2nd Edition, Sec. 735, p. 1269, as follows: 
"Probably the best definition of the word 
diligence was given by Le-wis, C. J., in rendering 
the opinion in an early Nevada case. It is there 
defined as 'the steady application to business of 
any kind, constant effort to accomplish any under-
taking.' 'It is the doing of an act or series of acts 
with all possible expedition, -with no delay except 
such as may be incident to the work itself.' 
"As has been said, the law does not require 
any unusual or extraordinary efforts, but it does 
require that wh.ich is usual, ordinary, and reason-
able. The diligence required in the prosecution 
of the construction of all \vorks necessary for the 
diversion and application of water in an attempted 
appropriation of the same is that constancy or 
steadfastness of purpose or labor \Yhich is usual 
with men engaged in like enterprises, and who 
desire a speedy acco1nplishment of their designs. 
There must be such assiduity in the prosecution of 
the "rorks as will 1nanifest to the \Yorld a bona 
fide intention to con1plete it \vithin a reasonable 
time. As to "rhat constitutes diligence is a question 
of fact and must be determined from all the cir-
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ctnnstances surrounding each particular case." 
Section 736, discusses how reasonable diligence is 
ascertained: 
""As to whether the work of construction was 
begun within a reasonable time after the notice 
was given of the intent to appropriate water, and, 
after its commencement, was prosecuted with all 
reasonable diligence, are questions of fact to be 
determined from all the circumstances surround-
ing each particular case, as the same are disclosed 
by the evidence. And upon this question there 
may be taken into consideration the acts of the 
appropriators such as surveys, stakes set, and 
the blazing of trees, the time of the commencement 
of the work and its actual prosecution until the 
same is completed. In other words, as was said by 
the Oregon Court: 'The appropriator is entitled 
to a reasonable time withjn which, by ordinary 
diligence, he may complete the project and actually 
apply the water to the useful purpose intended. 
What is reasonable, both as to the amount of 
water and as to the time any given project may be 
completed, must depend upon the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case.' 
"The climate of the part of the country where 
the appropriation is attempted is also a proper 
subject, upon the question as to whether the work 
can be prosecuted during all the year, or only for 
a portion of the year; also the topography of the 
country "\Vhere the works have to be constructed 
and through which the canal has to run, as to 
whether the same be level or rough, and whether 
the soil is easy to work or whether rock work is 
encountered, and the like. So, also, the difficulty 
of obtaining labor, tools, or material; also the ex-
tent and magnitude of the works themselves. The 
financial standing of the parties attempting the 
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appropriation, arnd their ability to raise the means 
to prosecute the work to completion, are also 
facts for consideration. Evidence of any of these 
facts are proper in the determination of the ques-
tion as to whether or not reasonable diligence has 
been exercised in the construction of the works 
necessary to divert and conduct the water attempt-
ed to be appropriated to the place where it is 
to be used.'' (Emphasis added) 
Various cases have also involved the problem of what 
is a reasonable time in which to develop water projects. 
In Seaward v. Pacific L-ivestock Company, (1907), 49 Or. 
157, 88 Pac. 963, at p. 965, the Court had this to say: 
"What is a reasonable time in which to apply 
water originally intended to be used for some 
beneficial purpose depends upon the magnitude 
of the undertaking and the natural obstacles to be 
encountered in executing the design." 
Also see Oliver v. Skinner, 190 Or. 423, 226 P.2d 507, 
where the problem involved a prior appropriator attempt-
ing subsequently to increase his appropriation, alleging 
it was a part of the original plan. While the Court de-
nied the claim, it did set do\Yn a guide as to the length 
of time one might have to co1nplete his appropriation. 
Quoting from 226 P.2d 507: 
"The appropriator is, of course, allowed a 
reasonable time to complete the application of the 
appropriated water to the c.ontemplated beneficial 
use. What constitutes such reasonable time de-
pends largely upon the size of the project. . .. " 
In Campbell v. Wyorning Develop1nent Co., 55 Wyo. 
347, 100 P.2d 124 suit was brought by various individuals 
to quiet title to water rights against the development 
company. In holding for the defendant \vhich had taken 
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a long time in developing the project the court observed: 
"The water u1ust be used for a beneficial pur-
pose within a reasonable time. But what is such 
time depends upon the circumstances in each case, 
and particularly ~tpon the magnitude of the enter-
prise and the difficulties encountered." (Italics 
added.) 
And again: 
"The courts ought not, we think, take it upon 
themselves to declare that the right of gradual 
development was taken away from the defendant 
company as a matter of law by the mere fact that 
the development was slow . . ." 
A Federal District Court case from the State of 
vVashington indicates the various activities which will 
constitute diligence. See United States v. Big Bend 
Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459. 
A good Utah case on the authority of the State 
Engineer to extend time for proving up on applications 
is In ReApplication 7600 to Appropriate. 30 Second Feet 
of Water, (1924) 63 Utah 311, 225 Pac. 605. That case 
involved the question of whether or not the State En-
gineer n1ay grant an extension of time to an applicant 
for an appropriation of water under the limited statutory 
provision which existed at that time after he has once set 
a time in which all appropriation work must be com-
pleted. The ·Court concluded that good reasoning would 
demand that the State Engineer be permitted to grant 
extensions of time beyond the date originally set. 
In commenting on the ability and judgment of the 
State Engineer, the Court at page 608 of 225 Pac. had 
this to say: 
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"That the state engineer is a competent judge, 
and probably more competent to determine the 
necessity for extending the time than anyone else, 
from the very nature of his position, ought to be 
conceded without serious question. Such has been 
his practice under the present statute since its en-
actment in 1919. That reasonable extensions from 
time to time are necessary is clearly shown in the 
record before us. In his letter addressed to C. W. 
Morse, to which reference has been made, he sta-tes 
the fact to be that during the three years next 
preceding the trial in the district court he had 
found it necessary on account of financial condi-
tions to extend the time in 75 per cent of the appli-
cations filed in his office. In the very nature of 
thi:ngs it is impossible for the engineer to foretell 
in advance just how long it wiJll require to complete 
the work and put the water to a beneficial use." 
(Italics added.) 
It is also interesting to note that over the years the 
statutes of this state have been revised to a considerable 
extent; and it appears that each revision has been for the 
purpose of easing the burden on the appropriator of 
water. At the time the above case was decided (1924) the 
statute provided that the state engineer could grant 
reasonable extensions within a 1 ± year period; however, 
an applicant was compelled to apply to the District Court 
for an extension of time beyond 14 years. (La"'S of Utah 
1919, Chap. 67, Sec. 52) Now an applicant 1nay submit 
requests for extensions of time to the state engineer after 
the 14 year period; and the state engineer is authorized 
to grant extensions for periods ''"'hich total up to 50 years. 
Later, 'vhen the above case "Tent back to the Supreme 
Court for a determination on the merits as to whether 
or not the applicants had prosecuted their work diligently 
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and as to whether or not their project was practicable 
(73 (Ttah 50, 272 Pac. 225), the Supreme Court upheld 
the district court in affirming the state engineer's decision 
to grant an extension of time. Among other things the 
Court concluded that it was not error to allow testimony 
to co1ne into the record concerning the expense and time 
spent on construction of pipes and laterals to bring waters 
from nearby Granite Creek into the proposed reservoir 
site, as "\vell as expense and time spent in constructing 
works, which woud carry the water from the proposed 
reservoir to the lands to be irrigated ; that such evidence 
was material to show that work under a different applica-
tion, to appropriate water from Red Cedar Creek, had 
been prosecuted with due diligence when the waters from 
Red Cedar Creek would also be diverted into the reser-
voir site. The opinion did not state what other work, jf 
any, had been done directly on Red Cedar Creek. 
As to the conclusiveness of the engineer's decision, 
the Court had this to say: 
"Evidence justifying or authorizing the court 
to hold that the state engineer had abused his dis-
cretion in granting an extension, in our judgment, 
should be quite conclusive to the effect that the 
party asking for the extension was not entitled 
thereto." ( 272 Pac. at p. 227) 
Extensive research on the subject has failed to dis-
close any lTtah case where the court has reversed the de-
cision of the state engineer in granting an extension of 
time. As "\Ve view the law, the purpose of the changes 
in the statute was to enlarge the power of the engineer 
to grant longer periods of time in which applicants might 
prove up on water filings. 
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It is very significant in this rna tter to note that the 
statute in question, 73-3-12, U.C.A., 1953, was amended 
as late as 1947, said amendment providing the state engin-
eer with authority to grant extensions of time on con-
struction of work and application of water to beneficial 
use up to a period of fifty years. Prior to the amendment, 
the limit of the state engineer's authority to extend was 
forty years. It is a fundamental principal of statutory 
interpretation that the intent of the legislature must be 
followed where the intent is clearly present. It is obvious 
from this fairly recent amendment that the legislature 
for the State of Utah anticipated long periods of time 
which would be necessary to develop water resources 
beneficially in this area. Certainly there should be no ex-
ception to the present case. 
Appellants rely upon the case of Rio Puerco Irriga-
tion Co. v. Jastro, 19 N.J\1. 149, 141 Pac. 874, as involving 
a statute "similar to ours.'' Appellants quote a portion 
of Section 29 of the New Mexico statute but fail to quote 
Section 35 of the same statute which gave the engineer 
power to extend the tin1e on construction for three and 
two years respectively and further limited the extensions 
to the ground of "physical and engineering difficulties.~' 
By Section 35 the engineer is obligated to allo\v an ex-
tension of time equal to the time during which work was 
prevented by operation of la\Y or other cause beyond the 
power of the applicant to control. A cursory examination 
of these provisions "Till clearly distinguish theN ew Mexi-
co procedure and law from that outlined by our statute. 
Section 73-3-12, lT:C.A. 1953, provides for an ex-
tension of time up to fourteen years 1nerely upon a suffi-
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cient showing by affidavit. From fourteen to fifty years, 
extensions may be granted, but only after notice and hear-
ing. It would seem entirely unfair and unreasonable to 
compare a statute which specifically provides for three 
and two year extensions and one providing for up to fifty 
years extension of time by the state engineer. It should 
also be noted that the New Mexico case was decided solely 
on the question of whether or not the appropriators' fi-
nancial inability to proceed with the project as planned 
was good grounds for an extension of time by the State 
Engineer. The case held that it was not. However, all 
the courts are not in agreement on this point and there 
are decisions which appear to be in conflict. See I Wiel, 
Water R~ghts in the United States, 3rd Edition, Sec. 383, 
p. 413: 
"Upon the point of delay because of pecuniary 
inability the decisions seem to conflict. In Cali-
fornia, Nevada, and Oregon, lack of funds will 
not excuse delay; but it seems otherwise in Colo-
rado and Idaho." 
In the case of Pool v. Utah County Light and Power 
Co., et al., 36 Utah 508, 105 Pac. 289, our Supreme Court 
commented on the power vested in the state engineer to 
grant extensions of time: 
"The purpose of vesting such powers in the 
state engineer seems apparent enough. The stat-
ute fixes a final limit which applies to all applica-
tions alike. Some applications however, like the 
one in question, require a large expenditure of 
money and a considerable time before the appro-
priation can be perfected by the full completion 
of the contemplated works. In order therefore, 
to hasten the completion of the works as fast as 
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possible, the engineer is authorized to fix a limit 
much less than the statutory limit. He also is 
authorized to fix a limit in accordance with the 
magnitude of the work." 
Appellants also cite the case of Maricopa County 
MuniciJpal Water Conservancy DistriJct v. Southwest 
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369. Not only were the 
facts substantially different in that case but as in the 
other cases cited by Appellants where extensions of time 
were refused, the Supreme Court affir1ned the decision 
of the lower court or the state engineer which had denied 
the application for an extension. In the ~1aricopa County 
Case, supra, defendants' predecessor in interest had dur-
ing the year 1888 initiated some appropriation of water 
from the river and expended money thereafter in con-
struction of diversion dam and canal. However the diver-
sion dam and canal were practically destroyed and all 
work stopped in 1895. Fro1n that time until approximate-
ly 1925, the only work done in furtherance of the rights 
was the maintaining of a watchman and the expenditure 
of some $25,000.00 for surveys and attorney fees. It will 
be noted that over 37 years had elapsed bet,veen the time 
of the commencen1ent of the appropriation until the fur-
ther work was to be done in 1925. In the present instance, 
Applicant had had less than 20 years from the date of the 
approval of its application and under a statute which au-
thorizes extensions of time up to 50 years. 
We cannot see how the case of Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 
148, 2 Pac. 901 has any bearing on the issues of this case 
except to define the doctrine of "relation back." The court 
there said: 
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'~To acquire a right to water from the diver-
sion thereof, one must, within a reasonable time, 
employ the same in the business for which the 
appropriation is made. What shall constitute such 
reasonable time is a quest~on of fact depending 
upon the circttmstances connected with each par-
ticular case." (Italics added.) 
Again, in the case of In Re Whi~te River, 155 Or. 148, 
G:2 P.2d 22, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the state engineer denying a third extension of 
time where the state engineer had imposed terms and 
conditions for an extension of time which had not been 
complied with. As stated by the Supreme Court, Appel-
lants had "wholly failed to comply with the terms and 
conditions under which the extension had been made" 
so that the decision of the state engineer refusing further 
to extend the time was affirmed. Indeed, we may state 
·without fear of contradiction that there are no cases in 
which the Supreme Court has reversed the lower court or 
the State Engineer in granting an extension of time in 
"\vhich the prove up on an application for appropriation of 
\Yater "\Vhere such extension of time was granted upon 
the sho,ving of diligence or reasonable cause for delay. 
Appellants claim that no plan has been adopted by 
Applicant for the construction of the Gooseberry Project. 
This is entirely contradictory to the evidence adduced in 
the case. Not only have plans been prepared for the 
project but the actual details for the construction of the 
tunnel at the Gooseberry or "Narrows" site have been 
heretofore made and revision of those plans and details 
could be made in sufficient time to have the matter sub-
mitted to bid within six months, according to the testi-
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mony of the private engineer, Richard C. Hansen. (R. 
17 4) In fact, as testified by l\1r. Hansen, not many proj-
ects are started with more preliminary work than we now 
have on the Gooseberry Project. (R. 171) While there is 
no actual detail on the construction of the reservoir dam, 
such detail is not significant at this time since that will 
be a matter of further development of the project and, as 
testified by Mr. Hansen, his work was primarily con-
cerned with the immediate project of getting the tunnel 
detail prepared. (R. 169, 170) 
Appellants attempt to confuse the issue by stating 
that there are two plans which are being alternately pro-
posed. As far as the record in this case is concerned, 
the only plan which has been proposed and planned by 
the Applicant is the Gooseberry site. While it is true 
that the Bureau of Reclamation has endeavored to obtain 
funds to construct a larger dam and reservoir at the 
"l\1ammoth" site, this plan was not the plan of Applicant. 
Applicant merely allowed the Bureau of Reclamation 
to proceed with its survey and recommendation between 
1949 and 1953 until the program was submitted to Con-
gress for appropriation. The construction of the reser-
voir and tunnel at the Gooseberry site will, in the opinion 
of the witnesses for Applicant, cost less than approxi-
mately $700,000.00 not the $2,204,000.00 suggested by 
Appellants in their Brief. (R. 163, 196) 
It is true as stated by Appellants that Applicant is 
relying not only upon its O\Vn activity but upon the ac-
tivity of the Bureau of Reclan1ation in cooperation with 
Applicant to support a showing of diligence as well as 
reasonable cause for delay. We 1nake no apology for such 
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activity. As a matter of fact, many of the reclamation 
projects in the \Vest would have been not only infeasible 
but in1possible had it not been for the cooperation be-
tween local agencies and the Federal Government, and 
the financial assistance supplied by the latter. Nor is it 
with apology that Applicant states it has hoped to obtain 
Federal assistance in the construction of this project. 
Surely Appellants do not apologize for having induced 
the Federal Government to construct the one million dol-
lar Scofield Dam in return for One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars to be paid by Appellants. This project would have 
been indefinitely delayed and may never have been built 
but for such financial aid and the willingness of Applicant 
to forego its immediate claims for Gooseberry for the 
over all benefit of the·Carbon County interests. 
vVe respectfully submit that the evidence is sufficient 
to sustain the finding of the court that Applicant has used 
due diligence in connection with its application. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFI·CIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
FINDING OF REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY. 
What has heretofore been said as to the evidence 
with respect to showing diligence applies equally to the 
evidence as to reasonable cause for delay. Surely the 
statement of facts clearly demonstrates reasons why 
.A.pplicant has not proceeded with construction of the 
tunnel andjor the reservoir prior to this time. In fact, 
what has been stated with respect to the interference 
by Appellants with the program for financing the con-
struction of the project sufficiently demonstrates that 
Applicant has reasonable cause for delaying the con-
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struction. Nor does the question of "feasibility" have 
anything to do with the matter. As heretofore stated 
the feasibility of the project was established not only 
in the 1953 report of the Bureau of Reclamation but 
likewise in the supplemental report issued September, 
1957. (Exh. 15) Like\vise, Mr. Neeley, who has had 
more experience than any other person in the accumu-
lation of the data and information preliminary to the 
construction of the Gooseberry project, testified that 
in his opinion the project was economically justified 
at this time. (R. 122) Appellants rely upon a statement 
contained in Exhibit 33 at page 77 wherein Mr. Temple-
ton, author of this publication, attempted to give his 
opinion as to the effect upon existing water rights if 
the Gooseberry project were built. We wish to point 
out that at the time this exhibit was introduced in evi-
dence the exhibit vvas offered "only as to the factual 
matter contained in it, including resumes of many water 
applications and including a copy of the l\1orris Decree 
on the Price River and a copy of various court pro-
ceedings with respect to a water right known as the 
mammoth reservoir site." Based upon that statement 
of counsel and upon the statement that the court could 
receive it pro forma and consider it for what it would 
be worth, the exhibit \vas received in evidence. (R. 218, 
219) Obviously, the conclusion. of l\1r. Templeton con-
cerning the relative 1nerits of the \Vater rights of the 
respective parties is not an issue in the case. Of more 
significance is the testilnony of Appellants' witness, 
Lawrence C. Monson \Vho testified that there was 71,999 
acre feet of water allocated to Carbon County under 
the Morse decree and that there \Vere only approxi-
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mately 7,920 acres of land to be irrigated which would 
indicate 9.3 acre feet of water per acre of land. (R. 
229, 230) 
Likewise Mr. Monson testified that the Bureau of 
Reclamaton in its land survey studies in 1956 and 1957 
had determined that under the Price River there were 
only 2353.7 acres of good productive land in Carbon 
County, approximately 8,440.1 of fair productive land, 
and 1,896 acres of poor yield making a total of 13,189.8 
acres of arable land in Carbon County with an allo-
cated water right of some 71,000 acre feet. (R. 231) 
Likewise, some of the water previously used for irri-
gation has been sold to the Utah Power and Light 
Company and other industrial consumers and yet the 
number of acres of land under irrigation has apparently 
increased without increasing the amount of appropria-
tion. (R. 229) 
We respectfully submit that under the facts of this 
case, the Court was justified in determining and finding 
that Applicant had reasonable cause for the delay which 
it has encountered over the years since 1939 in sub-
mitting proof on its application. 
POINT V 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JUDGMEN·T. 
Respondents have no dispute with Appellants a8 
to the law with respect to the requirement that findings 
of fact are necessary. However, as indicated by Ap-
pellants in their brief, the court found the ultimate facts 
to the effect that Applicant has "shown reasonable 
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diligence in proceeding to prove up on its application 
and to put the water to beneficial use." Further, the 
court found that Applicant has "shown reasonable cause 
for delay in constructing the entire works of diverting 
the water to the lands in Sanpete Valley." Both of 
these matters are matters of ultimate fact and not 
conclusions of law. True, the court did not go into the 
evidentiary facts which support the ultimate facts found 
by it; but Rule 52 (a) U.R.C.P. does not require either 
the pleading or the finding of evidentiary facts. Al-
though the proposed findings were submitted to the 
court and served upon opposing counsel prior to the 
time they were signed, and although counsel made a sug-
gested change which was adopted by the Court (see typo-
graphical change which appears on the third line of the 
Judgment, R. 31) no claim was made that the findings 
were insufficient or that the findings as made did not set 
forth the ultimate facts in dispute between the parties. 
We respectfully submit that the findings of the court 
which sustain the decision of the state engineer are 
adequate and sufficient in the instant matter and that 
no prejudice has resulted to Appellants because of any 
brevity therein. 
SUMMARY 
Respondents respectfully submit to the Court that 
Appellants do not have any right or standing in this 
court to question either the decision of the State Engi-
neer or the decision of the District Court for the reason 
that they are not "interested" parties as defined by 
Section 73-3-12 U.C.A., 1953 or "aggrieved" as defined 
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.; 
~: 
by Section 73-3-14 U.C.A. 1953. In any event, the de-
cision of the State Engineer as affirmed by the trial 
court is supported by the evidence and this Court on 
review should not disturb the decision of the lower court. 
\ 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General of Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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